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SUMMARY 
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INTRODUCTION 
Regarding the current role of nuclear power globally, 
it should be noted that in 2017 449 commercial nuclear 
power reactors are operating in 31 countries, with over 
392,116 MWe (megawatt electrical) of total capacity 
(WEC 2017). Recently, the average age of the world’s 
nuclear reactors is 29.53 years; 64.81% of the global 
nuclear reactors have operated for at least 30 years while 
90 reactors have run for 40 years or more. The largest 
number of reactors can be found in the USA (99), which is 
followed by France (58) and Japan (42), while the 
distribution of the installed gross capacity by world region 
indicates that Europe has the largest nuclear power plant 
capacities. In 2015 nuclear reactors generated 2,441 TWh 
(terawatt-hours) of electricity globally, which means that 
worldwide 10.7% of total electricity generation came from 
nuclear energy and the “big five” nuclear generating 
countries, i.e. the USA, France, Russia, South Korea and 
China (before 2012 Germany was one of the biggest 
nuclear energy generating countries) produced 70% of the 
total nuclear-based electricity in the world (Schneider et al. 
2016).  
After the nuclear accident in Fukushima in March 
2011, the continued use of nuclear energy in the European 
Union (EU) gained vast political and public attention. In 
the EU it is up to each member state to decide whether to 
produce nuclear power. Debate on nuclear energy 
utilisation among European member states is not a new 
phenomenon. As Nuttall stressed in 2009, in the EU the 
national opinions on nuclear energy generation differ 
significantly due to the diverse national experiences. 
Nuttall classified the member states based on their 
opinions using key criteria reflecting the formal 
government policies, the extent to which policy is a 
consensus across major political parties, the level of 
acquiescence and public acceptance of policy, and the 
scale of operating infrastructures in 2006 (Nuttall 2009). 
According to this classification (see Table 1), member 
states were almost exactly balanced in their opinion of 
nuclear energy. Analysing the impact of the Fukushima 
disaster, Thomas (2012) distinguishes between four types 
of European reactions:  
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1. Reject the option of new reactors and force the closure 
of existing plants, 
2. Accelerate the closure of existing plants in countries 
with previously long-term nuclear phase-out policies; 
enhanced public pressure against nuclear power plants, 
3. Not proceed with plans for new plants, 
4. Proceed with plans for new plants as if the accident in 
Fukushima had little or no relevance at all.  
Table 1 
EU member states’ opinions concerning nuclear energy 
before and after the Fukushima Daiichi Accident 
EU member states’ opinion concerning nuclear energy in 2006 
Strongly Positive Weakly Positive Neutral Weakly 
Negative 
Strongly Negative 
Finland; France; 
Romania; Lithuania; 
Bulgaria; Czech 
Republic; Hungary; 
Slovakia 
UK; Netherlands; 
Spain; Portugal; 
Poland; Latvia; 
Estonia; Slovenia 
Luxembourg; Denmark; 
Malta; Cyprus 
Italy; 
Germany; 
Sweden; 
Belgium; 
Greece 
Ireland; Austria 
EU member states’ opinion concerning nuclear energy after the Fukushima accident 
Positive (Strongly or weakly) Divided Negative (Strongly or weakly) 
UK; Poland; Finland; Romania; Czech 
Republic; Hungary; Slovakia 
Bulgaria; France; 
Lithuania; Netherlands; 
Slovenia; Spain; 
Sweden 
Austria; Italy; Denmark; Germany; 
Belgium 
 
Source: own summary based on Nuttall (2009, pp. 7-8) and Holmberg (2013) 
Classification in table 1 can be confirmed by the facts 
presented in ESA (2013), Södersten (2012), Feblowitz 
(2013), and IEA (2013). According to these sources, 
following the 2011 nuclear catastrophe at Fukushima, 
Germany announced that it had decided to replace atomic 
reactors with more fossil fuel-fired plants and a growing 
share of clean-energy sources, and eight reactors were shut 
down immediately. The German Chancellor also stated 
that by 2022 all nuclear reactors in the country would be 
closed down. Italy decided not to restart its nuclear power 
programme, which was abandoned in the 1980s, and 
Switzerland also decided to abandon plans to build new 
nuclear reactors and will phase out its existing plants. In 
other countries, the Fukushima accident seems to have had 
limited political impact. Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, 
Romania, Slovakia, Finland and the United Kingdom 
continued their ongoing projects to expand nuclear power. 
A strategy plan for new construction has been approved in 
Poland and political support for future new construction 
was confirmed in the UK. After the 2012 French elections, 
France expressed its intention to reduce the share of 
nuclear in its future energy mix. The French government 
has scheduled closure of the country’s oldest plant in 2016; 
however, the government continues to support the 
construction of the first European Pressurised Reactor at 
Flamanville (IEA, 2013, p. 34).  The Flamanville-3 project 
is six years late and now expected to start up until the 
fourth trimester 2018 (Schneider et al. 2016, p. 180). As 
Holmberg (2013) highlighted, in spite of these limited 
changes and movements in national approaches, opinions 
concerning the role of nuclear energy remained diverse 
among the member states (see also Table 1).  
In 2017 there is a total of 128 nuclear reactors in 14 of 
the 28 countries of the EU, with an installed net electric 
capacity of 110,561 MWe in operation. In addition to 
nuclear reactors and power plants a sum of 140 research 
reactors can also be found in the EU (46 in Germany, 26 
in France, 19 in the UK and 14 in Italy), moreover 26 
nuclear fabrication, 10 fuel processing, and 45 fuel storage 
facilities are situated across the member states (EC 2013; 
WEC 2016). Regarding the geographical distribution of 
reactors, around 45% of the European Union’s nuclear 
park is located in France, and only 14% can be found in 
the Eastern European Countries with nuclear plants. From 
technological point of view the 128 nuclear reactors in 
operation in the European Union are based on different 
technologies and types, but are mainly pressurised water 
reactors (101), although boiling water reactors (11) gas 
cooled reactors (14) and pressurised heavy-water reactors 
(2) can also be found. Figure 1 shows the number and the 
net operating capacity of nuclear reactors in the European 
Union between 1985 and 2017.  
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Source: own summary based on PRIS database 
Figure 1. Number of nuclear reactors and net operating capacity (in GWe) 
in the European Union (including the UK) 
Between 2009-2010 nuclear power capacities 
increased about 1% and 2 GW were removed from the 
system. The net operating capacity in the EU achieved its 
historical maximum in 1998, and in 2013 the number of 
reactors was 12 fewer than before the Fukushima events (8 
reactors in Germany and 1 in the UK exited from service). 
It should be noted that in the European Union the so-called 
“Nuclear Renaissance”1 was suppressed by the economic 
crisis and market uncertainties induced by deregulation, 
liberalisation and privatisation tendencies. Since 2000 
only two new nuclear reactors (in the Czech Republic and 
Romania) have been connected to the grid (WEC 2016, p. 
21); therefore, in the absence of newly constructed plants, 
nuclear reactors in the European Union are ageing.  
Figure 2 illustrates the number of grid-connected 
European nuclear reactors by years of operation. 
According to this figure, 14 reactors from the total capacity 
have reached or exceeded the age of 40 years, and the large 
majority of installed reactors have been operating for at 
least 30 years. In 2017, the average age of European 
nuclear reactors is 32.53 years. In addition to this, while 
nuclear reactors are designed for 30-40 years of operation, 
there is a tendency that the operators of the reactors try to 
extend the reactor’s lifetime to 50-60 years. According to 
its forecast, the EC (2013) also suggests that between 2010 
and 2025, 38 nuclear reactors will have to be 
decommissioned in the EU and the decommissioning time 
of 104 reactors will be apposite after 2025, or is still 
unknown. While Foratom (2015) proposed a target of 
commissioning 100 new nuclear reactors between 2025 
and 2045 (WNA 2017a), as Figure 3 shows, as of March 
2017 two reactors – Olkiluoto-3 in Finland and 
Flamanville-3 in France – are under construction in the 
western part of the EU, while in June 2009 the construction 
of Mochovce-3&4 in Slovakia restarted and the General 
Assembly of Slovenské Elektrárne (SE) shareholders 
approved SE's strategic plan for 2017-2021, including the 
release of funds (€5.4 billion) for the Mochovce nuclear 
power plant expansion (Enerdata 2017). According to the 
latest available information Mochovce-3&4 are expected 
to start commercial operation in 2017. Besides these, 
delayed construction projects representing a total of 
4,392GWe nuclear capacity and 32 new units (sum of 
38,645GWe) are planned or proposed in the European 
Union.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1  As WNA titled the phenomenon in which several countries around the world decided to invest or reinvest in nuclear generation in the beginning of 
the 21st century. 
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Source: own summary based on PRIS database 
Figure 2. Number of nuclear reactors proposed, 
planned or under construction in the EU-28 (as of March 2017) 
In 2011 primary production of nuclear energy in the 
EU-27 counted for 234,010 Mtoe, which represents a 1% 
reduction between 2005 and 2011, while during the period 
between 2011 and 2015 primary production of nuclear 
energy reduced by 5.47% to 221,202 Mtoe. Nuclear 
energy was the most important source of electricity 
production in 2012, when nuclear power produced 26.8% 
of the commercial electricity in the European Union.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: own model, based on PRIS and EUROSTAT databases 
Figure 3. Shares of nuclear energy in electricity production – EU-28 
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Figure 3 illustrates the changes in the share of nuclear 
power in electricity production by the European member 
states. As the figure shows, between 2011 and 2012 the 
contribution of nuclear energy to electricity generation 
stagnated or decreased in most of the member states; a 
significant increase was observed only in the Netherlands 
(+22.22 percentage points), Czech Republic (+6.97%p) 
and Hungary (+6.00%p). In France 74.8% of electricity 
was generated by nuclear reactors, and nearly half of 
nuclear electricity generated in the EU came from French 
nuclear power plants in 2012. Between 2012 and 2016 the 
contribution of nuclear energy to electricity generation 
slightly increased in most of the member states, while a 
significant reduction can be observed three countries, 
namely in the Netherlands (23%p), Czech Republic 
(17%p) and Germany (19%p). Although electricity 
production is by far the principal function of today’s 
operating reactors, in the EU member states a number of 
them are also currently used for district heating (in 
Hungary, Bulgaria, Romania, Czech Republic, Slovakia) 
and for process heating (in Slovakia) as well (IAEA 2013, 
2017). 
In order to better understand the debate on nuclear 
power and the fragmented nature of national policies, in 
the following section pros and cons of nuclear energy 
generation will be summarised in the light of the effects of 
Fukushima and the future role of nuclear energy presented 
in the European energy scenarios published before and 
after the accident. 
DATA AND METHODS 
In order to examine the main impacts of the Fukushima 
Daiichi accident and the future role of nuclear power use 
in the European Union, scenarios released before and after 
the Japanese disaster are analysed. 
Table 2 
Overview of the EU-28 scenarios released before March 2011 
Source: Prognos (2011) 
Studies published before 2011 were summarised by 
Prognos (2011), commissioned by the European 
Commission. This paper investigates eight governmental, 
non-governmental and academic or university studies with 
26 mid- and long-term future energy scenarios for the 
European Union, particularly with regard to the role of 
nuclear power. Table 2 summarises the main targets of the 
13 EU-28 scenarios analysed by Prognos (2011) and 
selected for further investigation in this paper. 
Study Scenario name Main targets 
IEA (2009): 
World Energy 
Outlook 
WEO ref No specific targets 
WEO 450 ppm Stabilising worldwide greenhouse gas (GHG) concentration below 450 ppm 
IEA (2010): 
Energy 
Technology 
Perspectives 
ETP Baseline No specific targets 
ETP Blue Map Stabilising worldwide GHG-concentration below 450ppm 
EU DG ENER 
(2010): Trends 
to 2030 update 
2009 
EU DG TREN 
Reference 
20-20-20 targets achieved by 2030 
EU DG – ENV 
Baseline 
EU DG – ENV NSAT 
EU DG – ENV NSAT-
CDM 
ECF (2010): 
Roadmap 2050 
ECF Baseline No specific targets 
ECF 80% RES -80% GHG of 1990 levels by 2050 
ECF 60% RES -60% GHG of 1990 levels by 2050 
ECF 40% RES -40% GHG of 1990 levels by 2050 
Greenpeace&E
REC (2010): 
Energy 
[R]evolution 
Reference Scenario 
E[R] Ref. No specific targets 
Revolution Scenario  
E [R] basic -80% GHG of 1990 levels by 2050 
Advanced Scenario  
E[R] Adv  
100% Renewable energy sources (RES) share of primary energy 
demand and -95% GHG of 1990 levels by 2050 
Eurelectric 
(2009): Power 
Choices 
Eurelectric Power 
Choices -40% GHG of 1990 levels by 2030 and -75% by 2050 
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Studies released after the Fukushima Daiichi fallout are 
the available publications of IEA (2012a) World Energy 
Outlook; European Commission (2011) Energy Roadmap 
2050; and IEA (2012b) Energy Technology Perspectives, 
representing in sum 11 scenarios, while IEA (2016) World 
Energy Outlook consists the latest available official energy 
scenarios. The main goals of the 14 scenarios examined are 
reflected in Table 3.  
Table 3 
Main targets and details of scenarios released after 11 March 2011 
Study Scenario Short name Main targets  
IEA (2012a) 
World Energy 
Outlook 
Current policy scenario 
WEO_2012_current_EU 
Government policies adopted by mid-2012 continue unchanged 
New policy scenario 
WEO_2012_new_EU 
To provide a benchmark to assess the potential achievements of recent developments 
in energy and climate policy. Existing policies are maintained and recently 
announced commitments and plans are implemented in a cautious manner. 
450 ppm scenario WEO_450_EU 
To demonstrate a plausible path to achieve the climate target. Policies are adopted 
that put the world on a pathway consistent with having around a 50% chance of 
limiting the global increase in average temperature to 2°C in the long term, compared 
with pre-industrial levels.  
IEA (2016) 
World Energy 
Outlook 
Current policy scenario 
WEO_current_2016 
Implementation of any new policies or measures beyond those already supported by 
specific implementing measures in place as of mid-2016. 
New policy scenario 
WEO_new_2016 
Current measures are specifically time-bound and expire, they are not normally 
assumed to lapse on expiry, but are continued at a similar level of intensity through 
to 2040. 
450ppm scenario WEO_450_2016 Limiting the average global temperature increase in 2100 to 2°C above pre-industrial levels. 
IEA (2012b) 
Energy 
Technology 
Perspectives 
6°C scenario (6DS) 
ETP_2012_6Ds 
Largely an extension of current trends. By 2050, energy use almost doubles 
(compared with 2009) and GHG-emissions rise even more. The average global 
temperature rise is projected to be at least 6°C in the long term. 
4°C scenario (4DS) 
ETP_2012_4Ds 
Takes into account recent pledges made by countries to limit emissions and step up 
efforts to improve energy efficiency. In many respects this is an ambitious scenario 
that requires significant changes in policy and technologies. Moreover, capping the 
temperature increase at 4°C requires significant additional cuts in emissions in the 
period after 2050. 
2°C scenario (2DS) 
ETP_2012_2Ds. 
Energy system consistent with the 450ppm emissions trajectory. The 2DS 
acknowledges that transforming the energy sector is vital, but not the sole solution: 
the goal can only be achieved if CO2 and greenhouse gas emissions in non-energy 
sectors are also reduced. 
EC (2011) 
Energy 
Roadmap 2050 
Reference scenario EU_2011_ref 
40% emission reduction by 2050 
Includes current trends and long-term projections on economic development, 
policies adopted by March 2010, i.e. 2020 targets for RES share and GHG 
reductions as well as the Emissions Trading Scheme (ETS) Directive. 
Current policy initiatives 
EU_2011_cpi 
40% emission reduction by 2050 
Updated measures adopted, e.g. after the Fukushima events following the natural 
disasters in Japan, and being proposed as in the Energy 2020 strategy; the scenario 
also includes proposed actions concerning the "Energy Efficiency Plan" and the 
new "Energy Taxation Directive" 
High energy efficiency 
EU_2011_high_ee 
85% emission reduction by 2050 
Political commitment to very high energy savings; including e.g. more stringent 
minimum requirements for appliances and new buildings; high renovation rates of 
existing buildings; establishment of energy savings obligations on energy utilities. 
This leads to a decrease in energy demand of 41% by 2050 as compared to the 
peaks in 2005-2006. 
High renewable energy sources 
EU_2011_high_res 
85% emission reduction by 2050 
No technology is preferred; all energy sources can compete on a market basis with 
no specific support measures. Decarbonisation is driven by carbon pricing, 
assuming public acceptance of both nuclear power and Carbon Capture & Storage 
(CCS). 
Diversified supply technologies 
EU_2011_div_tech 
85% emission reduction by 2050 
Strong support measures for RES leading to a very high share of RES in gross final 
energy consumption (75% in 2050) and a share of RES in electricity consumption 
reaching 97%. 
Delayed CCS. EU_2011_d_ccs 
85% of GHG emission reduction by 2050 
Assuming that CCS is delayed, leading to higher shares for nuclear energy with 
decarbonisation driven by carbon prices rather than technology push. 
Low nuclear 
EU_2011_low nuclear  
85% emission reduction by 2050 
Similar to diversified supply technologies scenario but assuming that no new 
nuclear capacity (besides reactors currently under construction) is being built, 
resulting in a higher penetration of CCS (around 32% in power generation). 
Source: own summary, based on EC (2011) and IEA (2012a, 2012b, 2013) 
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Besides the aforementioned studies and scenarios, 
statistics of nuclear reactors used in this paper are provided 
by the EUROSTAT database and the PRIS database of the 
International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). MS Excel 
was used for the calculations and for the creation of 
figures. 
RESULTS 
Strengths and Weaknesses of Nuclear Energy  
The future role of nuclear power plants in the European 
Union depends on the main supporting and adverse factors 
associated with the use of nuclear energy. Based on the 
relevant literature and reports, these factors are 
summarised in Table 4. Promoters of nuclear energy often 
stress that nuclear power meets the main goals of the 
European Energy Policy and criteria for a sustainable 
energy mix, i.e. use of nuclear power can contribute to 
energy independence, security of supply, while it is 
affordable and has low emission potential (Bernard 2013). 
There is broad international acceptance that stabilising the 
atmospheric concentration of greenhouse gases at below 
450 parts per million (ppm) of carbon-dioxide equivalent 
would help avoid the worst impacts of climate change. In 
the EU, the energy sector is by far the largest source of 
greenhouse-gas (GHG) emissions, accounting for 29% of 
the total in 2015. Nuclear energy is seen to offer a major 
contribution to action against climate change, due to its 
low emissions of CO2. Compared to fossil-fuel based 
energy generation technologies, nuclear power at the point 
of electricity generation does not produce any GHG 
emissions that damage local air quality (e.g. WEC 2007a; 
2007b; Bauer et al. 2008; NEEDS 2008). If nuclear energy 
were expanded 10 fold, it could help in reducing total 
annual CO2 emissions in the second half of the 21st 
century by about 30% (van der Zwaan 2006; IEA 2013). It 
is also estimated that nuclear power plants have nearly zero 
regional environmental impact regarding their 
acidification and eutrophication potentials. The major 
environmental and health issues of nuclear energy 
utilisation are considered to be radioactive waste 
generation and management and ionizing radiation. 
However, there is a controversy at European level as to 
whether nuclear energy should be classified as renewable. 
On 4 February 2011 the European Council recognised its 
status as carbon-neutral energy, alongside renewables. 
Concepts rejecting the renewable status of nuclear power 
plants are based on the fact that natural uranium and other 
types of fuel are not renewable energy resources.  
Table 4 
The nuclear debate 
PROS 
1. Supports the goal of European energy policy by 
meeting the 4 criteria for a sustainable mix: 
a. low carbon energy source 
b. competitive costs 
c. reduce fossil fuel dependency 
d. reduce GHG emissions 
2. Stable output 
3. High efficiency 
4. Ready-to-use technology 
5. Existing supply chain available 
6. Wastes and risks can be managed 
7. Nuclear safety can be ensured by appropriate 
measures 
CONS 
1. Public pressure against the use of nuclear energy 
2. Waste and safety concepts and costs (as well as 
health, environmental effects) 
3. Need for further RD&D activities 
4. Problems associated with financing new nuclear 
projects, state aid needed 
5. Need for ageing management 
6. Need for risk and hazard management 
7. Long construction time 
8. Risk of exposure to radiation 
9. Problems with fuel and waste transportation 
10. Uranium is not a renewable source 
11. Strong dependence on external sources of uranium 
12. Non-proliferation issues 
Source: own summary, based on WEC (2007a), IEA & NAE (2010), Andoura et al. (2011), Keppler & Marcantonini 
(2011), Euroconfluences (2011), OECD&NEA (2012), Thadani et al. (2012), Fisher (2013), Keppler et al. (2013), 
Bernard (2013), ENEF (2013), Poncelet (2013) 
Uranium is a main source of fuel for nuclear reactors, 
and according to the WEC (2016) worldwide output of 
total identified uranium resources has grown by 70% since 
2005, and identified resources of uranium are considered 
sufficient for over 100 years of supply based on current 
requirements. In 2012, demand for natural uranium in the 
EU represented approximately one third of global uranium 
requirements. Regarding energy independence, Europe is 
strongly dependent on external sources of uranium. 
Uranium is mined in 20 countries, although about 80% of 
world production comes from just ten mines in five 
countries: Australia, Canada, Kazakhstan, Namibia and 
Niger in 2016 (WNA 2016). European uranium delivered 
to EU utilities originated in the Czech Republic and 
Romania and covered only 2.6% of the EU’s total 
requirements in 2015 (ESA 2015). However, uranium 
reserves are distributed more evenly and available in large 
quantities in several politically stable countries (including 
Canada and Australia) by comparison with hydrocarbons. 
According to ESA (2015) in 2015 the enrichment services 
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supplied to EU utilities totalled 12,493 tSW (1 tonne of 
separative work equals to 1000 separative work unit, 
which measures the effort made in order to separate the 
fissile, and hence valuable, U-235 isotopes from the non-
fissile U-238 isotopes, both of which are present in natural 
uranium), delivered in 1,989 tonnes of low-enriched 
uranium, which contained the equivalent of 16,090 tonnes 
of uranium (tU). Of this, 60% of the requirements were 
delivered by European providers, while the quantity of 
mixed-oxide fuel loaded into nuclear power plants in the 
EU totalled 10,780 kg of plutonium, which represents a 
15% increase over the amount of plutonium used in 2011. 
ESA (2015) suggest that gross average reactor 
requirements for natural uranium will grow to 
16,745 tU/year for 2016-2025 and then decrease to 
14,588 tU/year for the 2026-2035 period. For 2016-2025 
gross average reactor requirements for separative work 
will reach 13,657tSW/year and 11,890 tSW/year for the 
period between 2026 and 2035 (ESA 2015).  
One of the biggest advantages of nuclear energy is seen 
in its stability. Nuclear power plants have high availability 
and load factors, while their dispatchable nature and load-
following capability ensure that the energy produced is not 
dependent on weather conditions. According to the PRIS 
database, for the period 2014-2016 the EU-wide average 
energy availability of nuclear plants was 83.86%, and the 
highest availability was experienced in Romania, Finland 
and Slovenia, while in 2016 unit capability factors 
exceeded 90% in Finland, Hungary, Romania and Spain.   
 
Source: IEA & NAE (2015, p. 59) 
Figure 4. Levelised costs (LCOE) of electricity of 
European nuclear plants (USD/MWh) 
Nuclear energy is said to be one of the most 
competitive energy generation technologies due to its cost 
structure and limited impacts of fuel price volatility. 
According to the joint report of the International Energy 
Agency and the Nuclear Energy Agency (2015) the 
levelised cost of electricity (LCOE) - i.e. the per-kilowatt-
hour cost building and operating a generating plant over an 
assumed financial life and duty cycle (EIA 2017, p. 1) - of 
new nuclear plants in 2030 will be competitive with other 
generating options; however the more investment 
intensive the option, the more sensitive the LCOE is to the 
value of the discount rate (see Figure 4). Investment costs 
represent by far the largest share (around 60% on average) 
of LCOE, as construction costs of nuclear energy 
generation are significantly higher in comparison to those 
for fossil fuel technologies. In 2016 nuclear production 
costs in the European Union were around 1eurocent/kWh, 
which is much lower than for coal and gas plants (WNA 
2017b). Since fuel costs represent only 10-15% of total 
generation costs, fuel price volatility has little influence on 
production costs compared to fossil based energy 
generation.  
It is worth mentioning that beside fuel cost fluctuations 
the range of generating costs depends on the age of the 
given nuclear plant and the regulatory requirements 
concerning safety inspections and security measures, since 
O&M costs represent around 24%. The IEA & NAE 
(2015) also estimates that decommissioning and disposal 
costs make up 10% and 15% of the capital costs of a plant. 
While nuclear investment costs are estimated to show a 
constant but small decline by 2035 or 2050 in scenario 
studies analysed by Prognos (2011), the EC (2011) 
estimates a slightly higher risk premiums for new nuclear 
investment in Current Policy Incentives and 
Decarbonisation scenarios, because they consider that 
investors might factor into their decisions the possible 
effects of policy reactions to the Fukushima accident, 
which affect nuclear plants under investment 
consideration. It is also estimated by the IEA (2012b) that 
due to the aging nuclear European capacity, serious 
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investments need to start around 2020, and while the third 
generation designs of nuclear power plants deliver 
superior safety they are extremely expensive. Due to cost 
overruns and project delays, capital needs of a nuclear 
project stretch the financial capability even of the largest 
utilities, and the very unusual risks hinder bank financing 
(IEA 2012b, p. 178). This also suggests that in order to be 
able to refinance the high capital costs, new nuclear power 
plants need a guaranteed long operating life and 
guaranteed high full-load operation. In competitive energy 
markets investment risks and financial challenges are 
dominant (van der Zwaan 2008; WEC 2013). In general, 
in the EU-27 between 2000 and 2004 energy investments 
were delayed because of the political and regulatory 
changes affecting energy markets. Energy scenarios for 
2035 and 2050 being analysed emphasise that measures 
towards the creation of the integrated European energy 
market will continue to affect the risks associated with new 
energy investments. OECD & NEA (2012, p. 81) suggests 
that decisions to build a nuclear power plant represent a 
greater commercial risk than is normally associated with 
other electricity sources, because:  
 The technical complexity of nuclear plants tends to 
lead to delays in construction and cost overruns; 
 Changes in government policy or legislation affecting 
nuclear energy, or in regulatory requirements, could 
delay the plant in entering operation, adding to costs; 
 Such changes occurring during the plant’s operating 
lifetime could also add to costs and potentially prevent 
the plant from operating for its full lifetime; 
 The long planning and construction timescale and long 
operational lifetime provide greater potential for long-
term changes in the electricity market to impact 
revenues; 
 At the same time, the high proportion of fixed costs 
(due largely to high investment costs) results in greater 
vulnerability to short-term market fluctuations; 
 There may be uncertainties about the costs the plant 
will be required to pay for decommissioning and long-
lived waste disposal.  
ENEF (2010) highlighted that external financing of 
nuclear project is particularly challenging because of: high 
capital cost and long payback times; uncertainties related 
to planning and construction period including supply chain 
constraints, possible delays, cost overruns and changing 
regulations; the fact that the economics of nuclear power 
is sensitive to regulation related to safety and market 
conditions (volatility in the price of carbon credits); the 
specific nature of nuclear projects (political uncertainties, 
public acceptance); and the related costs of spent fuel, 
waste management and decommissioning. It is also 
stressed in the literature (e.g. van der Zwaan 2008; Fiáth & 
Megyes 2010; Kiyar & Wittneben 2012; Virág et al. 2012) 
that in the new liberalised energy markets with new types 
of risks (market risks, political risks, regulatory risks, price 
and cost risks, technological risks, etc.), private investors 
value rapid and high returns increasing the cost of capital. 
The economic crisis and the Fukushima Daiichi accident 
have exacerbated the problem of financing new nuclear 
power plants by highlighting the need for higher safety 
standards and creating a more critical public attitude 
(Kiyar & Wittneben 2012). In order to facilitate new 
constructions, ENEF (2010) suggests that new and 
innovative financing models must be stimulated, such as 
power user investments, utility joint ventures and power 
user–power supplier agreements, and project finance.  
While the nuclear industry itself is multi-faceted and 
supports 250,000 highly qualified direct jobs, including 
engineers and researchers, and around 800,000 jobs in total 
(Foratom 2012, p. 16), public acceptance of nuclear energy 
utilisation is one of the five classic problematic features of 
nuclear energy. However, according to Berényi (2015, p. 
81) public awareness, knowledge about the possibilities, 
legal regulation, reliability of supply chain and cultural and 
religious traditions should also be considered in an 
investment project initiative. The 2005 Eurobarometer 
survey (EC 2005) showed that the EU public is not well 
informed on nuclear issues, including possible benefits in 
terms of mitigating climate change and the risks associated 
with the different levels of radioactive waste (EC 2007, p. 
16). It found that 40% of the opponents of nuclear energy 
would change their mind if solutions to nuclear waste 
issues were found (EC 2007, p. 16). According to the 
report of Eurobarometer on Nuclear Safety (EC 2010), 
before the Fukushima accident 68% of European citizens 
thought that nuclear energy helped to make nations less 
dependent on fuel imports, 51% believed that nuclear 
energy ensured more competitive and more stable energy 
prices, and 46% considered nuclear energy as a technology 
that helps to limit climate change. While 51% of the 
respondents agreed that the risks of nuclear power as an 
energy source outweigh its benefits, 73% of EU citizens 
wanted nuclear energy to be maintained or decreased.  
According to the survey of IPSOS MORI (2012a) held 
after the Fukushima Daiichi accident, only 38% of global 
respondents supported nuclear energy as a way to 
producing electricity. In the European Union the reactions 
of citizens were diverse: in Germany and Belgium 
opposition to nuclear energy increased, and in 9 of 27 EU 
countries (Belgium, France, Germany, UK, Hungary, 
Italy, Poland, Spain and Sweden) less than 1/5 of those 
opposed to nuclear power reported that they had been 
influenced by the accident (IPSOS MORI 2011). Another 
survey of IPSOS MORI (2012b) comparing attitudes to 
nuclear energy in April 2011 (at the height of the 
Fukushima crisis) and in September 2012 showed that 
worldwide the level of public support for nuclear energy 
had increased by around 14% to 45% during that period in 
most countries. However, it should be noted that since then 
no European-wide opinion poll has been carried out 
(Foratom 2017, p. 5). Public acceptance, political attitude, 
approaches and measures towards the use of nuclear 
energy are significantly influenced by proliferation, 
radioactive waste management and nuclear safety 
concerns.  
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In response to the Japanese nuclear crisis, the European 
Union restarted discussions on the potential need for 
common action on the issue of nuclear crisis prevention, 
and the scope and modalities of stress tests as targeted 
reassessment of the safety margins of nuclear power plants 
in the light of the lessons drawn from the events in 
Fukushima related to extreme natural events challenging 
the plant’s safety functions was developed (Andoura et al. 
2011, p. 3; EC 2012). Additional costs of safety measures 
and improvements of nuclear power plants is estimated to 
be in the range of €30 million to €200 million per reactor 
unit (EC 2012). 
Besides the aforementioned aspects, the future of 
nuclear energy utilisation in the European Union is 
influenced by trends in energy and electricity demand, the 
development of different energy generation technologies, 
and policy decisions regarding climate change, nuclear 
safety requirements and RD&D. Figure 5 shows that 
carbon prices are estimated to rise moderately by 2030 and 
2050 respectively in all scenarios, despite the low recent 
EU-ETS prices and the uncertainty associated with the 
future system of EU-ETS. It should be noted that high 
carbon prices encourage the replacement of fossil-fuel 
based energy technologies by low carbon technologies, 
which is in favour of nuclear competitiveness for a base 
load electricity supply relative to fossil fuel technologies 
(ENEF, 2012 p. 51). 
Regarding fossil fuel prices, all scenarios reveal a 
moderate increase in coal prices by 2035 or 2050, and 
increasing gas and oil prices until 2030 can be expected, 
since, as Bartha (2015, p. 12) highlights, fuel prices are 
mostly influenced by the price of oil. In the medium term 
electricity prices are estimated to increase in almost all 
scenarios examined. Investment costs of renewable energy 
generation technologies are assumed to significantly 
decline (especially for concentrated solar power plants and 
wind) in the long term due to their learning rates, while the 
investment costs of coal and gas technologies are expected 
to increase because of necessity for carbon capture and 
storage (however it is also expected that Carbon Capture 
and Storage technologies will only be commercially 
available after 2030). ENEF (2012) emphasises that 
competition between technologies will also be influenced 
by national and EU-level taxation, the use of feed-in tariffs 
and subsidies for renewable technologies, and the stability 
and predictability of national and EU-level legislation, 
while technological progress regarding traditional and new 
type of grid structures (smart grids, smart metering) is also 
expected.  
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Source: own summary based on IEA (2009, 2010, 2012a; 2012b, 2016), Greenpeace & EREC (2009), Eurelectric 
(2009), EU DG ENER (2010), ECF (2010), and EC (2011) 
Figure 5. ETS prices in EUR2015/tCO2 in all scenarios examined 
Achieving the EU's energy objectives is only possible 
with modernisation of existing energy infrastructures. 
Energy R&D and innovation play an essential role in 
developing cheaper, more efficient and reliable energy 
technologies. In IEA member countries spending on low 
carbon energy RD&D over the last decade has shifted 
towards renewable sources, notably wind energy and solar 
PV, and as highlighted in IEA (2016), in the European 
Union the share of public RD&D spending on nuclear 
energy fell to 10% of the total budget by 2015. While the 
performance of existing nuclear reactors has been 
improving due to incremental innovations focusing on 
operational, safety, security, waste management, 
standardisation, and radiation protection issues, radical 
innovations in new type of nuclear designs and advanced 
fuels are still awaited against the fast technological 
innovations in renewable based technologies. Scenario 
studies analysed in this paper assume that the main 
research focus will still concentrate on Generation III/III+ 
reactor designs and Generation IV reactors are expected to 
become available for deployment beyond 2030. Besides 
electricity generation, the most important opportunity for 
nuclear energy in the available scenarios is the potential 
use of nuclear energy for direct heat and transportation 
purposes. 
Trends in Nuclear Capacities and Share in 
Electricity Generation 
Regarding electricity demand, as can be seen in Figure 
6 and Figure 7, all scenarios from the Prognos (2011) study 
and scenarios published directly after the Fukushima 
accident suggest that electricity demand could rise steadily 
until 2030, but by varying degrees due to the varied 
population growth expected by the authors. However, the 
decarbonisation of electricity generation and the expected 
rate of substitution towards electricity for fossil fuels in 
transportation and heating could play a significant role in 
the increase of total electricity demand.  
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Source: own summary based on IEA (2009, 2010), Greenpeace & EREC (2009), Eurelectric (2009), EU 
DG ENER (2010), and ECF (2010) 
Figure 6. Estimates of development of electricity demand in scenarios published 
before the Fukushima Daiichi accident 
Despite the fact that changes in the development of 
electricity generation and in its structure highly depend on 
the different assumptions used in the scenarios regarding 
renewable energy targets, GHG targets, limitations of new 
plant constructions and their cost structure, renewable 
energy sources are expected to play a major role across all 
scenarios in delivering electricity in 2050. In almost all the 
scenarios from Prognos (2011) and those released after the 
Fukushima accident, wind power technologies provide the 
major share of electricity from renewable sources. 
Electricity generation from fossil fuel sources will decline 
by 2050, according to all scenarios being analysed. 
According to the EU’s Energy Roadmap 2050 (EC 2011), 
the share of oil in net electricity generation will decline 
from 30% (in 2005) to 2.1-15.2% by 2050, while in all 
scenarios of EU Roadmap 2050 the share of gas and coal 
in power generation will also decrease by 2050 compared 
to 2005, to 15.1-19.5% and 2.1-15.2% respectively. In 
nearly in all scenarios (with the exceptions of Eurelectric’s 
Power Choices scenario, ECF’s 40% RES scenario, and 
EU’s Reference scenario) renewable energy sources 
contribute more to electricity supply in 2050 than fossil 
fuels or nuclear power; however, the role of Carbon 
Capture and Storage varies across the scenarios (Förster et 
al. 2012).  
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Source: own summary, based on EC (2011), IEA (2012a, 2012b, 2016), EC (2011) 
Figure 7. Estimates in development of electricity demand in scenarios published 
after the Fukushima accident 
Figures 8 and 9 display nuclear capacity estimated in 
the scenario studies examined. For nuclear power 
capacities and generation, in contrast to the global picture, 
the situation for the EU shows a large degree of variation. 
Looking at the baseline or reference scenarios before 2011, 
Eurelectric (2009), IEA (2009, 2010) and ECF (2010) 
scenarios project the continuing growth of nuclear 
generation. Nuclear generation and capacities tend to be 
highest in scenarios which have to reach ambitious 
emission targets. The use of nuclear power increases in 
almost all alternative scenarios published before 2011. 
These scenarios suggests that nuclear power plants are 
expected to be an economical option to provide baseload 
power, whereas fossil-fuel plants are mainly used for load-
following, with the exception of coal-fired plants with 
CCS (Prognos 2011, p. 74). The Eurelectric’s Power 
Choices Scenario projects an initial decline in nuclear 
power before a rapid rate of growth in the period 2020-
2050. Overall, it can be stated that in the scenarios 
examined in the Prognos (2011) study, nuclear energy 
based electricity generation tends to expand in the 
European Union, reaching shares of 35-45% of electricity 
generation. However, these scenarios generally do not 
calculate with the potential lifetime expansions of nuclear 
power plants and do not analyse in detail the relevant 
frameworks or contexts in which nuclear power can 
develop. While among the studies published before 2011 
the range of scenario projections is wide due to different 
assumptions, European scenarios of the EC (2011) and 
IEA (2012a, 2012b), presume that nuclear power 
generation and capacities will stabilise or even decrease by 
2030 or 2050.  
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Source: own summary based on IEA (2009, 2010), Greenpeace & EREC (2009), Eurelectric (2009), EU 
DG ENER (2010), and ECF (2010) 
Figure 8. Development of European nuclear power generation in scenarios released 
before the Fukushima Daiichi accident (TWh) 
 
Source: own summary, based on EC (2011) and IEA (2012a, 2012b, 2016) 
Figure 9. Development of European nuclear power generation in scenarios released 
after the Fukushima Daiichi accident (TWh) 
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As Figures 10 and 11 show, nuclear power generation 
and nuclear power capacity development in the European 
Union according to all scenarios released after 2011 will 
remain well under the level of 1,350 TWh and 160 GWe 
respectively, which are much lower compared to the 
earlier. In the WEO New Policy Scenario it is assumed that 
in the European Union installed capacity of nuclear power 
will reduce from 129 GW to 120 GW by 2035 as a result 
of the expected reduced competitiveness of nuclear power 
and higher rate of retirements. In contrast, the WEO 
450 ppm scenario of IEA (2012a) expects the highest 
nuclear capacity development (120 GW) and the second 
highest share of nuclear power in total electricity 
generation (1,045 TWh) by 2035. According to the ETP’s 
2DS scenario, in 2050 nuclear energy could account for 
around another one fifth of the electricity mix; however, it 
is also stressed in the forecast that while it is expected that 
most of the member states with nuclear power remain 
committed to its use despite the Fukushima accident, 
nuclear deployment by 2025 will be below levels required 
to achieve the 2DS objectives (IEA 2012b, p. 14).  
 
Source: own summary based on IEA (2009, 2010), Greenpeace & EREC (2009), Eurelectric (2009), EU DG 
ENER (2010), and ECF (2010) 
Figure 10. Predicted development of European nuclear capacities released 
before the Fukushima Daiichi accident (GWe) 
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Source: own summary, based on EC (2011) and IEA (2012a, 2012b, 2016) 
Figure 11. Predicted development of European nuclear capacities released 
after the Fukushima Daiichi accident (GWe) 
The EU’s Roadmap scenarios suggest that nuclear 
energy will be needed to provide a significant contribution 
in the energy transformation process in those member 
states where it is pursued (EC 2011, p. 9). Compared to the 
Reference Scenario, which expects the highest growth rate 
of nuclear development by 2050, in the Current Policy 
Initiatives scenario the share of nuclear power is lower due 
to a change in nuclear assumptions and policy changes 
after the Fukushima Daiichi accident. While nuclear power 
remains a key source of low carbon electricity generation, 
its contribution is expected to be lower than it was in the 
previous European scenarios. The highest penetration of 
nuclear comes in delayed EU’s Carbon Capture and 
Storage and Diversified Supply technologies scenarios 
(18% and 15% in primary energy, respectively); however, 
in the Diversified Supply Technologies Scenario nuclear 
generation is projected to decline after 2035 (EC 2011). 
In general all scenarios from Prognos (2011) stick only 
to the phase-out policies that were implemented before 
2011. Although some scenarios (e.g. Greenpeace & EREC 
2010) assumed total nuclear phase-out in the EU, in most 
of the studies nuclear phase-out assumptions are focused 
only on Belgium and Germany. A country-specific 
analysis is only revealed in EU DG ENER (2010) 
scenarios, in which Austria, Cyprus, Denmark, Greece, 
Ireland, Latvia, Luxembourg, Malta and Portugal are 
assumed to not to take into consideration nuclear power 
plants, while in Italy and Poland new nuclear power plants 
are expected to be developed, and the remaining European 
member states are assumed to have the possibility to 
further invest in nuclear power (Prognos 2011, p.112). 
Nuclear power capacities and the share of nuclear energy 
in electricity production are expected to significantly 
decline in most of the scenarios released before March 
2011 (except in the ETP Blue Map), indicating that 
generation share will increase slightly by 2030, with EU 
DG–ENV NSAT and EU DG–ENV NSAT CDM 
scenarios assuming minor development of nuclear power 
until 2020 and roughly stable generation until 2030, and 
the Eurelectric scenario which presuming a 42% increase 
in generation by 2050. In the scenarios of IEA (2012a, 
2012b) and EC (2011) released directly after the accident, 
the most important problems and questions of nuclear 
power utilisation in the European Union are associated 
with public acceptance and waste management. All 
scenarios take into consideration the current and expected 
policy reactions of the member states to the nuclear 
accident in Fukushima. It is also expected in the scenarios 
(except for EU_ref_2011) that political reaction after 
Fukushima and the increasing importance of security 
issues after stress tests might lead to a lower investment in 
nuclear power due to higher investment costs. In Energy 
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Technology Perspectives published by IEA in 2012, it is 
also stated that low investment in nuclear power 
generation and capacity by 2050 might lead to higher 
energy prices, higher CO2 emissions and higher import 
dependency in importing regions, i.e. it would make the 
achievement of sustainability targets more expensive and 
more difficult to reach (IEA 2012b, p. 178). These 
scenarios assume accelerated nuclear phase-outs in at least 
Germany and Switzerland. However, regarding the share 
of nuclear energy in electricity generation the studies are 
divided: while some scenarios presume that nuclear power 
will play a substantial role in the decarbonisation of the 
European electricity sector, others predict that the 
contribution of nuclear generation to total electricity 
generated in the EU will decrease by 2030 and 2050. The 
latest scenarios of the IEA (2016) forecast that nuclear 
capacities in the EU overall will decrease by 2035 but that 
capacities will increase in the UK, Finland and the Czech 
Republic and stabilise in France and Slovenia. Retirement 
of all nuclear plants in Germany will be achieved by the 
end of 2025. In Hungary and Slovakia nuclear capacities 
are expected to increase until 2030 and then decrease 
according to the IEA (2016) forecasts.  
CONCLUSIONS  
After the Fukushima Daiichi accident EU member 
states revised their energy policies associated with nuclear 
energy utilisation. The accident resulted in unprecedented 
efforts to review the safety of nuclear installations and 
legislation in Europe. Nuclear energy plays an important 
role in the European Union as the second largest source of 
electricity; however, the ageing of the reactors requires 
actions from each member state. Due to the fact that 
member states retain sovereignty over the use of nuclear 
power, some of the countries (e.g. France and Finland) are 
still expanding their nuclear capacities, building 
(Slovakia) or planning to build new nuclear reactors 
(Bulgaria, Romania, Czech Republic, Slovenia, the UK), 
or investing in nuclear fleet life-extension, upgrade or 
uprate activities (e.g. Hungary, Sweden, Slovakia, Spain), 
while after the Fukushima accident Germany and Belgium 
agreed to phase out nuclear generation by about 2022 and 
2025, respectively. This study outlines the differences 
among the different medium and long-term scenarios 
released before and after the Fukushima accident 
regarding the future role of nuclear energy, taking into 
account the main advantages and disadvantages of nuclear 
power in the EU. The following conclusions can be drawn 
after the analysis:  
 Nuclear power is seen as an important source of low-
carbon electricity, supporting energy security goals; 
nuclear power plants contribute to competitive base-
load electricity supply,  
 Lifetime-extensions, plant upgrade and uprate, plant 
retirements and licence renewals need common rules, 
standards and policies and financial support,  
 For the member states wishing to encourage new 
nuclear power plants and maintain nuclear options in 
the long term, new and innovative financing models 
must be stimulated, 
 Direct impacts of policy changes after the Fukushima 
Daiichi accident did not fundamentally change the 
tendencies drawn up from earlier energy scenarios, 
since capacity shut-downs were already taken into 
account, at least in the case of Belgium and Germany.  
 Most of the scenarios released after the Japanese 
accident indicate a higher rate of reduction in nuclear 
capacities in the EU by 2030 or 2050 and a smaller 
share of nuclear power in electricity generation than the 
studies published before 2011, while low-carbon 
scenarios still presume that nuclear power will play a 
substantial role in the decarbonisation of the European 
electricity sector as manifested in a larger share of 
nuclear power in electricity generation in the EU, 
 Higher rates of uncertainty associated with the 
direction of future trends and status of EU-ETS system, 
electricity prices, or fuel prices are assigned in the 
latest scenarios examined compared to the assumptions 
of earlier studies. 
Abbreviations 
EC: European Commission 
ECF: European Climate Foundation 
ENEF: European Nuclear Energy Forum 
EU-ETS: The EU Emission Trading System 
Foratom: European Atomic Forum 
GWe: gigawatt electric, electric output of a power plant in 
gigawatt 
GHG: Greenhouse Gas 
IAEA: International Atomic Energy Agency 
IEA: International Energy Agency 
MWe: megawatt electric, electric output of a power plant 
in megawatt 
NAE: Nuclear Energy Agency 
OECD: Organisation for Economic Co-operation and 
Development 
RD&D: Research, Development &Demonstration 
RES: Renewable Energy Sources 
SWU: Separative Work Unit 
tU: tonne of Uranium 
tSW: tonne of Separative Work 
TWh: terrawatt-hour, power in terrawatts multiplied by 
the time in hours 
WEC: World Energy Council 
WNA: World Nuclear Association 
 
  
 33 
Nikolett Deutsch 
REFERENCES 
ANDOURA, S., COEFFE, P., & DOBROSTAMAT, M. (2011): Nuclear Energy in Europe, Notre Europe. Policy Brief, 
Retrieved: 04.11.2013: http://www.notre-europe.eu/media/pdf.php?file=Bref25-nuclear_energy-EN-web_01.pdf 
BARTHA, Z. (2016): Hungarian Energy Prices in an OECD Comparison. Theory, Method, Practice, 12(1), 9-18., 
http://dx.doi.org/10.18096/TMP.2016.01.02 
BAUER, C, HECK, T., HIRSCHBERG, S., & DONES, R. (2008). Environmental Assessment of Current and Future 
Swiss Electricity Supply Options. Conference Paper, Paul Scherrer Institute, International Conference on Reactor 
Physics, Nuclear Power: A Sustainable Resource. Interlaken, Switzerland, September 14-19, CD-ROM, 41(43) 
ISBN:978-3-9521409-5-6, p.6. 
BERÉNYI, L. (2015). Social Aspects and Challenges of Renewable Energy Usage. 81-88., In: ORTIZ, W., 
SOMOGYVÁRI, M,, VARJÚ, V., FODOR, I., & LECHTENBÖHMER, S. (Eds): Perspectives of Renewable Energy 
in the Danube Region. Pécs: Institute for Regional Studies Centre for Economic and Regional Studies Hungarian 
Academy of Sciences 
BERNARD, H. (2013): What Outlooks for Nuclear. Presentation, 8th ENEF Plenary Meeting, 30-31. May 2013, 
Retrieved: 04.11.2013: 
http://ec.europa.eu/energy/nuclear/forum/meetings/doc/2013_05_30/day1/mr_bernard_enef_2013.pdf 
EC (EUROPEAN COMMISSION), (2005): Eurobarometer on Nuclear Safety. In FORATOM (2012): What people really 
think about nuclear energy. Retrieved: 13.11.2013: 
http://www.foratom.org/jsmallfib_top/Publications/Opinion_Poll.pdf,  
EC (EUROPEAN COMMISSION), (2007): Communication from the Commission to the Council and to the European 
Parliament, Nuclear Illustrative Programme, Retrieved: 13.11.2013: http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=COM:2006:0844:FIN:EN:PDF 
EC (EUROPEAN COMMISSION), (2010): Europeans and Nuclear Safety. SPECIAL Eurobarometer 324. 
Eurobarometer Report, Retrieved: 13.11.2013: 
http://ec.europa.eu/commfrontoffice/publicopinion/archives/ebs/ebs_324_en.pdf 
EC (EUROPEAN COMMISSION), (2011): Energy Roadmap 2050, Impact assessment and scenario analysis, Retrieved: 
04.12.2013: http://ec.europa.eu/energy/energy2020/roadmap/doc/roadmap2050_ia_20120430_en.pdf,  
EC (EUROPEAN COMMISSION), (2012): Communication from the Commission to the Council and the European 
Parliament on the comprehensive risk and safety assessments ("stress tests") of nuclear power plants in the European 
Union and related activities, Retrieved: 14.11.2013: 
http://ec.europa.eu/energy/nuclear/safety/doc/com_2012_0571_en.pdf 
EC (EUROPEAN COMMISSION), (2013): Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament and the 
Council on the use of financial resources earmarked for the decommissioning of nuclear installations, spent fuel and 
radioactive waste. Retrieved: 22.11.2013: 
http://ec.europa.eu/energy/nuclear/decommissioning/decommissioning_en.htm 
ECF (European Climate Foundation), (2010): Roadmap 2050, Retrieved: 13.11.2013: 
http://www.roadmap2050.eu/reports 
EIA (US Energy Information Administration), (2017): Levelized Cost and Levelized Avoided Cost of New Generation 
Resources in the Annual Energy Outlook 2017. Retrieved: 21.04.2017: 
https://www.eia.gov/outlooks/aeo/pdf/electricity_generation.pdf 
ENEF (European Nuclear Energy Forum), (2010): Strengths – Weaknesses – Opportunities – Threats (SWOT) Analysis, 
Part 1: Strengths & Weaknesses. ENEF Working Group Opportunities – Subgroup on Competitiveness of Nuclear 
Power, European Nuclear Energy Forum. Retrieved: 13.11.2013: 
http://ec.europa.eu/energy/nuclear/forum/opportunities/doc/competitiveness/swot-report-part1--final.pdf 
ENEF (European Nuclear Energy Forum), (2012): Strengths – Weaknesses – Opportunities – Threats (SWOT) Analysis, 
Part 2: Opportunities & Threats, Retrieved: 13.11.2013: 
http://ec.europa.eu/energy/nuclear/forum/opportunities/doc/competitiveness/swot-report-part2--final.pdf 
ENEF (European Nuclear Energy Forum), (2013): The contribution of nuclear power to EU 2030 energy and climate 
strategy, ENEF/WG Opportunities/Competitiveness, Retrieved: 11.11.2013: 
http://ec.europa.eu/energy/nuclear/forum 
ENERDATA (2017): SE increases Mochovce nuclear expansion budget plan (Slovakia), 04.04.2017, Retrieved: 
05.05.2017: https://www.enerdata.net/publications/daily-energy-news/se-increases-mochovce-nuclear-expansion-
budget-plan-slovakia.html 
ESA (Euratom Supply Agency), (2013): Annual Report 2013, Retrieved: 11.11.2013: 
http://ec.europa.eu/euratom/ar/ar2012.pdf 
 34 
The Changing Role of Nuclear Power in the European Union … 
ESA Euratom Supply Agency), (2015): Annual Report 2017, Retrieved: 11.11.2013: 
http://ec.europa.eu/euratom/ar/ar2015.pdf 
EU DG-ENER (European Commission Directorate-General for Energy in collaboration with Climate Action DG and 
Mobility and Transport DG), (2010): EU energy trends to 2030 — Update 2009, Retrieved: 12.11.2013: 
https://ec.europa.eu/energy/sites/ener/files/documents/trends_to_2030_update_2009.pdf 
EURELECTRIC (2009): Power Choices, Pathways to Carbon-Neutral Electricity in Europe by 2050, Retrieved: 
09.11.2013: http://www.eurelectric.org/media/45274/power__choices_finalcorrection_page70_feb2011-2010-402-
0001-01-e.pdf 
EUROCONFLUENCES (2011): The European Files: Security of Energy Supply in Europe: Continuous Adaptation. 
Retrieved: 13.11.2013: http://www.euroconfluenes.com 
FEBLOWITZ J. (2013): Nuclear Power Generation at the Crossroad. White Paper, IDC Energy Insights, p. 19, Retrieved: 
13.11.2013: https://www.emc.com/collateral/analyst-reports/229066-new-age-of-nuclear.pdf  
FIÁTH, A., & MEGYES, J. (2010): A hálózatos iparágak szabályozási környezete (Regulatory environment of the 
network industries). Vezetéstudomány (Budapest Management Review), 51(5), 4-11. ISSN 0133-0179 
FISHER, C. (2013): Investment in low-carbon technology, Role of nuclear energy, Retrieved: 04.11.2013: 
http://ec.europa.eu/energy/nuclear/forum/meetings/doc/2013_05_30/day1/mrs_fisher_enef_2013.pdf,  
FORATOM (European Atomic Forum), (2012): What people really think about nuclear energy. Retrieved: 06.11.2013: 
http://www.foratom.org/jsmallfib_top/Publications/Opinion_Poll.pdf  
FORATOM (European Atomic Forum), (2017): What people really think about nuclear energy. Retrieved: 21.04.2017: 
http://www.foratom.org/jsmallfib_top/Publications/Opinion_Poll.pdf 
FÖRSTER, H., HEALY, S., LORECK, C., MATTHES, F., FISCHEDICK, M. - LECHTENBÖHMER, S., SAMADI, S., 
& VENJAKOB, J. (2012): Metastudy Analysis on 2050 Energy Scenarios, Smart Energy for Europe Platform. 
Retrieved: 06.11.2013: http://www.oeko.de/oekodoc/1517/2012-080-en.pdf 
GREENPEACE & EREC (European Renewable Energy Council), (2010): Energy [R]evolution: A Sustainable World 
Energy Outlook. Retrieved: 12.11.2013: 
http://www.greenpeace.org/international/Global/international/publications/climate/2010/fullreport.pdf 
HOLMBERG, J. (2013): The Nuclear Debate within the EU - EU Member States For or Against - A Status Report. 
Brussels Direct EU Affairs Consulting. Retrieved: 10.11.2013: 
http://www.brusselsdirect.eu/resource/TheEUNuclearDebate-AStatusReport-February2013.pdf 
IAEA (International Atomic Energy Agency), (2013): Nuclear Technology Review 2013, Retrieved: 12.11.2013: 
http://www.iaea.org/About/Policy/GC/GC57/GC57InfDocuments/English/gc57inf-2_en.pdf 
IAEA (International Atomic Energy Agency), (2017): Nuclear Power Reactors in the World, Retrieved: 
02.04.2017:http://www-pub.iaea.org/books/IAEABooks/12237/Nuclear-Power-Reactors-in-the-World-2017-Edition 
IEA (International Energy Agency), (2009): World Energy Outlook, Retrieved: 12.11.2013: 
https://www.iea.org/publications/freepublications/publication/weo-2009.html, https://doi.org/10.1787/weo-2009-en  
IEA (International Energy Agency), (2010): Energy Technology Perspectives, Retrieved: 12.11.2013: 
https://www.iea.org/publications/freepublications/publication/ETP2010_free.pdf, 
https://doi.org/10.1787/energy_tech-2010-en  
IEA (International Energy Agency), (2012a): World Energy Outlook, Retrieved: 12.11.2013: http://www.oecd-
ilibrary.org/energy/world-energy-outlook-2012_weo-2012-en, https://doi.org/10.1787/weo-2012-en  
IEA (International Energy Agency), (2012b): Energy Technology Perspectives, Retrieved: 12.11.2013: 
https://www.iea.org/publications/freepublications/publication/ETP2012_free.pdf, 
https://doi.org/10.1787/energy_tech-2012-en  
IEA (International Energy Agency), (2013): Tracking Clean Energy Progress 2013, Retrieved: 12.11.2013: 
http://www.iea.org/publications/freepublications/publication/TCEP_web.pdf, 
https://doi.org/10.1108/meq.2013.08324eaa.014  
IEA (International Energy Agency), (2016): World Energy Outlook, Retrieved: 12.04.2017: 
http://www.worldenergyoutlook.org/publications/weo-2016, https://doi.org/10.1787/weo-2016-12-en  
IEA (International Energy Agency) & NEA (Nuclear Energy Agency), (2010): Technology Roadmap, Nuclear Energy, 
Retrieved: 04.11.2013: http://www.iea.org/roadmaps, https://doi.org/10.1787/9789264088191-en  
IEA (International Energy Agency) & NEA (Nuclear Energy Agency), (2015): Projected Costs of Generating Electricity, 
Retrieved: 13.10.2016: https://www.oecd-nea.org/ndd/pubs/2015/7057-proj-costs-electricity-2015.pdf, 
https://doi.org/10.1787/cost_electricity-2015-en 
IPSOS MORI (2012a): After Fukushima, Global opinion on energy policy, Retrieved: 12.11.2013: 
http://ww.ipsos.com/public-affairs/SocialResearchInstitute 
IPSOS MORI (2012b): Global support for energy sources September 2012 – change since Fukushima, Retrieved: 
10.12.2013: 
http://www.ipsosmori.com/Assets/Docs/Polls/Global_@dvisor_global_trends_in_nuclear_energy_2012.pdf 
 35 
Nikolett Deutsch 
KIYAR, D., & WITTNEBEN, B. F. (2012): Nuclear Energy in the European Union after Fukushima: Political and 
Economic Considerations. CESifo DICE Report 10(3), 9-15. Retrieved: 12.11.2013: http://www.cesifo-
group.de/DocDL/dicereport312-forum2.pdf 
KEPPLER, J., H., & MARCANTONINI, C. (2011): Carbon pricing and the competitiveness of nuclear power. NEA 
News, 29(2), 4-8, Retrieved: 12.11.2013: http://www.oecd-nea.org/nea-news/2011/29-2/nea-news-29-2-e.pdf 
KEPPLER, J., H., COMETTO, M., & CAMERON, R., (2013): System effects of nuclear energy and renewables in low-
carbon electricity systems. NEA News, 30(2)-31(1), 4-7, Retrieved: 12.11.2013: https://www.oecd-nea.org/nea-
news/2013/30-2-31-1/nea-news-30-2-31-1.pdf 
NEEDS (2008): Final set of sustainability criteria and indicators for assessment of electricity supply options, NEEDS, 
Sixth Framework Program, Deliverable n° D3.2 – RS 2b, Retrieved: 2010.06.08: 
http://gabe.web.psi.ch/pdfs/Needs/NEEDS_RS2b_D3-2.pdf,  
NUTTALL, W.J. (2009): Nuclear Energy in the Enlarged European Union. EPRG Working Paper, Retrieved: 19.04.2017: 
http:// www.eprg.group.cam.ac.uk 
OECD (Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development) & NEA (Nuclear Energy Agency), (2012): Nuclear 
Energy Today, Retrieved: 12.11.2013: http://www.oecd-nea.org/pub/nuclearenergytoday/6885-nuclear-energy-
today.pdf 
PONCELET, J.-P. (2013): Report WG Opportunities, Presentation, 8th ENEF Plenary Meeting, 30-31. May 2013, 
Retrieved: 04.11.2013: 
http://ec.europa.eu/energy/nuclear/forum/meetings/doc/2012_05_14/presentations/status_report_on_wg_opportuniti
es_enef_bratislava_2012.pdf 
PROGNOS (2011): Analysis and comparison of relevant mid- and long-term energy scenarios for EU and their key 
underlying assumptions, Retrieved: 12.11.2013: 
https://www.prognos.com/uploads/tx_atwpubdb/110427_Prognos_EU_Energy_Scenarios.pdf 
SCHNEIDER, M., FROGGATT, A., HAZELMANN, J., KATSUTA, T., RAMANA, M.V., FAIRLIE, I., MALTINI, F. 
THOMAS, S. (2016): The World Nuclear Industry Status Report 2016, Retrieved: 19.04.2017: 
https://www.worldnuclearreport.org/The-World-Nuclear-Industry-Status-Report-2016-HTML.html  
SÖDERSTEN, A. (2012): The EU and Nuclear Safety: Challenges Old and New, European Policy Analysis, September, 
Retrieved: 12.11.2013: http://www.sieps.se 
THADANI, A., TESCHENDORFF, V., & GAUVAIN, J. (2012): International joint projects on nuclear safety: 30 years 
of benefits. NEA News, Vol. 30(1), Retrieved: 12.11.2013: http://www.oecd-nea.org/nea-news/2012/30-1/nea-news-
30-1.pdf 
THOMAS, S. (2012): What will the Fukushima disaster change? Energy Policy, 45, 12–17. 
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.enpol.2012.02.010 
van der ZWAAN, B. (2008): Prospects for nuclear energy in Europe. International Journal of Global Energy Issues, 30(1-
4), 102 – 121., https://doi.org/10.1504/IJGEI.2008.019858 
VIRÁG, M., FIÁTH, A., VIRÁG, A. (2012): Szabályozott iparágak. (Regulated industries) Kossuth Kiadó: Budapest, p. 
277 
WEC (World Energy Council), (2007a): The Role of Nuclear Power in Europe, Retrieved: 12.11.2013: 
https://www.worldenergy.org/publications/2007/the-role-of-nuclear-power-in-europe/ 
WEC (World Energy Council), (2007b): Nuclear Energy – Status and Outlook, Retrieved: 12.11.2013: 
http://www.worldenergy.org,  
WEC (World Energy Council), (2013): World Energy Resources, Retrieved: 12.11.2013: 
https://www.worldenergy.org/publications/2013/world-energy-resources-2013 
WEC (World Energy Council), (2016): World Energy Resources, Retrieved: 12.04.2017: 
https://www.worldenergy.org/publications/2016/world-energy-resources-2016 
WEC (World Energy Council), (2017): World Energy Issues Monitor 2017, Retrieved: 12.04.2017: 
https://www.worldenergy.org/publications/2017/world-energy-issues-monitor-2017 
WNA (World Nuclear Association), (2016): Uranium Mining Overview, Retrieved: 12.04.2017: http://www.world-
nuclear.org/information-library/nuclear-fuel-cycle/mining-of-uranium/uranium-mining-overview.aspx 
WNA (World Nuclear Association), (2017a): Nuclear Power in the European Union, Retrieved: 12.04.2017: 
http://www.world-nuclear.org/information-library/country-profiles/others/european-union.aspx 
WNA (World Nuclear Association), (2017b): Nuclear Power Economics and Project Structuring, Retrieved: 21.04.2017: 
http://world-nuclear.org 
DATA SOURCES 
EUROSTAT database: http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/help/first-visit/database 
PRIS database: Power Reactor Information System Database of the International Atomic Energy Agency: 
https://www.iaea.org/pris/ 
 36 
